Romania's Party of Social Democracy Survives...For Now
Tags: Romania Balkans Romanian politics
Romania’s once-invincible ex-communist party nearly imploded a week ago, and is now simmering in an uneasy armistice.
Senior figures in the Party of Social Democracy (PSD) almost succeeded in pushing former prime minister and former party president Adrian Năstase and his supporters out. It’s hard to be sure who was the engine, but judging from statements and interviews, and the history of the last fifteen years, likely candidates are former Năstase ally and current party secretary general Miron Mitrea, and parliamentary leader Viorel Hrebenciuc. In the process, they succeeded in obtaining support from current PSD president Mircea Geoana, and, for a time, PSD founder and former state president Ion Iliescu.
Năstase, with great reluctance, but under pressure from mounting scandals and government investigation of his family’s wealth, resigned recently from the post of speaker of the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of Romania’s parliament). His supporters had been pushing for an extraordinary party congress to debate a platform proposal, nominally over the party’s political identity, but in all likelihood a cover for launching a leadership struggle.
PSD’s current leadership has been a fragile, tense compromise since the April 2005 party congress following electoral defeat at the end of 2004. Inconclusive earlier votes and hallway negotiations at that congress produced the surprising dethronement of the party’s “spiritual leader,” Ion Iliescu, in favor of Geoana as president. The deal also installed Năstase as executive president, formally the number two post, and Mitrea as secretary general, the number three post.
Iliescu by all accounts was furious at being suddenly deserted by old lieutenants and the party more generally at the April 2005 congress.He had expected to win with no trouble, and had been shooed-in as the party’s leader in parliamentary opposition after his 1996 electoral defeat for the state presidency. (The Romanian president is constitutionally barred from holding formal party membership, and gives it up upon entering office, though all post-communist presidents have nonetheless frequently behaved in partisan ways.) He even reportedly contemplated leaving the party after the April 2005 congress.
The corruption scandals around Năstase personally, as well as perceptions of his arrogant behavior as prime minister from 2000-2004, were the pretext for the trading of public barbs since the beginning of the year. Those scandals, however, could only trigger more finger-pointing over party-wide corruption that has dogged the PSD's ranks since its earlier incarnations as the governing party from 1992-1996, and the continued corruption of 2000-2004 that played a major role in the party’s defeat in the 2004 local and national elections.
Under threat to his post as executive president, Năstase apparently tried to negotiate a golden exit for himself and his supporters, particularly parliamentarians, to the Conservative Party of media magnate Dan Voiculescu. Năstase was ultimately rebuffed, in part because the Conservative Party’s nominal partners in the ruling coalition view Voiculescu and his small party as opportunists they might prefer to dump at the first opportunity. In fact, the much larger Democratic Party (close to President Trăian Băsescu) responded by threatening expulsion from the governing coalition if the conservatives implemented their deal with Năstase.
Năstase thereby endured withering criticism from his own party. In fact, in a stunning display of “spontaneity,” several party branches in the provinces declared any proposals for a new platform and congress to be close to internal treason, and moved to start excluding Năstase’s supporters. Geoana all but indicated his willingness to see Năstase leave the party. Iliescu, once the dominant patron who had brought Năstase into the party and its senior leadership in 1993, was at one point apparently prepared to see his former protégé go as well, in revenge for the April 2005 congress.
But Iliescu, grudgingly empowered by Geoana to arbitrate and smooth over the turbulence in the party ranks, rethought matters on the way to a last minute compromise a week ago.
Part of the calculation may well have been that the PSD was not going to slide farther in the polls (hovering around 20-25%) so long as it remained united with core support in the electorate, whereas a fracture into three smaller splinters implied a much narrower fight for survival in a bitter competition for the same ideological space.
The end result was that the expulsion of Năstase’s supporters stopped in its tracks (though a few have resigned from the party anyway). Geoana, Mitrea, and Hrebenciuc have reluctantly agreed to the extraordinary party conference and debate over programs that the Năstase faction wanted. Most importantly, Iliescu, once a simple party member after his fall from grace, is now back in his familiar saddle as the informal, indispensable arbiter of feuding factions. And Geoana, who reputedly never had much of a following in the party prior to the April 2005 congress, though he may have moderately increased it, has effectively ceded a great deal of what decision-making authority he had to the factions around Iliescu as well as Mitrea and Hrebenciuc.
If anyone should be nervous before the party congress, therefore, it should be Geoana. Nor can Năstase rest easy, given his willingness to sabotage the party by attempting to weaken its parliamentary strength. (Iliescu himself suggested that Năstase stay silent for a year as a simple party member.) At this point, the party branches and their barons (often parliamentarians doubling as branch presidents) are the prize in what will be a monumental battle, as factional leaders bid for their allegiances before the congress. That has been the pattern in every leadership crisis the party has faced since 1991.
From the perspective of the party system, governance, and pressing policy issues, however, the infighting in the PSD is not serving Romania well. There is a strong argument to be made that a responsible, disciplined opposition is exactly what Romania needs. First, it would keep a viable party system operating, helping to define issues, aggregate opinion, and improve government accountability to voters.
Second, in an ironic twist, the health and strength of the PSD could be especially important for the current coalition government, if past experience from 1996-2000 is any indication. Perpetual bickering, deepening corruption, and the resulting incoherence of the ruling coalition of 1996-2000 not only cost the CDR-PNL-PD-UDMR government power, it cost Romania precious time and immense state resources in reforming the economy, the justice system, and protecting civil liberties, and produced a surprising showing by the radical nationalist Greater Romania Party in the 2000 elections.
But if that bickering over 1996-2000 delayed Romania’s domestic reform agenda, its resumption under the current PNL-PD-UDMR coalition risks being even more costly, given the effort to join the EU in 2007 (or, given the EU’s escape clause), in 2008.
A strong PSD in opposition is thus exactly what the current ruling coalition needs to refocus and redouble its policy efforts. The trouble is that however PSD might resolve its leadership battle, some subset of leaders with stained reputations will remain. PSD has never been able to undergo a thorough housecleaning, and no party is ever likely to eliminate its top ranks in toto – let alone scrutinize all the mid-level figures who would have to carry out such a spectacular coup.



